Abstract. At Eurocrypt 2010 van Dijk et al. described a fully homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers. The main appeal of this scheme (compared to Gentry's) is its conceptual simplicity. This simplicity comes at the expense of a public key size inÕ(λ 10 ) which is too large for any practical system. In this paper we reduce the public key size toÕ(λ 7 ) by encrypting with a quadratic form in the public key elements, instead of a linear form. We prove that the scheme remains semantically secure, based on a stronger variant of the approximate-GCD problem, already considered by van Dijk et al. We also describe the first implementation of the resulting fully homomorphic scheme. Borrowing some optimizations from the recent Gentry-Halevi implementation of Gentry's scheme, we obtain roughly the same level of efficiency. This shows that fully homomorphic encryption can be implemented using simple arithmetic operations.
Introduction
Fully Homomorphic Encryption. An encryption scheme is homomorphic if it supports operations on encrypted data. For example RSA is multiplicatively homomorphic since c 1 = m e 1 mod N and c 2 = m e 2 mod N yield the encryption of m 1 · m 2 without using the private key. Similarly, Paillier cryptosystem [13] is additively homomorphic because from c 1 = g m 1 r N mod N 2 and c 2 = g m 2 s N mod N 2 one can compute the encryption of m 1 + m 2 . In a breakthrough work Gentry described in 2009 the first encryption scheme that supports both addition and multiplication on ciphertexts, i.e. a fully homomorphic encryption scheme [6] . The construction proceeds by successive steps: first Gentry describes a "somewhat homomorphic" scheme that supports a limited number of additions and multiplications on ciphertexts. This is because every ciphertext has a noise component and any homomorphic operation applied to ciphertexts increases the noise in the resulting ciphertext. Once this noise reaches a certain threshold the resulting ciphertext does not decrypt correctly anymore; this limits the degree of the polynomial that can be applied to ciphertexts.
Secondly Gentry shows how to "squash" the decryption procedure so that it can be expressed as a low degree polynomial in the bits of the ciphertext and the secret key (equivalently a circuit of small depth). Then the breakthrough idea consists in evaluating this decryption polynomial not on the bits of the ciphertext and the secret key (as in regular decryption), but homomorphically on the encryption of those bits. Then instead of recovering the bit plaintext, one gets an encryption of this bit plaintext, i.e. yet another ciphertext for the same plaintext; see Figure 1 for an illustration. Now if the degree of the decryption polynomial is small enough, the resulting noise in this new ciphertext can be smaller than in the original ciphertext; this is called the "ciphertext refresh" procedure. Given two refreshed ciphertexts one can apply again the homomorphic operation (either addition or multiplication), which was not necessarily possible on the original ciphertexts because of the noise threshold. Using this "ciphertext refresh" procedure the number of permissible homomorphic operations becomes unlimited and we get a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The prerequisite for the "ciphertext refresh" procedure is that the degree of the polynomial that can be evaluated on ciphertexts exceeds the degree of the decryption polynomial (times two, since one must allow for a subsequent addition or multiplication of refreshed ciphertexts); this is called the "bootstrappability" condition. Once the scheme becomes bootstrappable it can be converted into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme by providing the encryption of the secret key bits inside the public key.
Based on Gentry's approach, two different fully homomorphic schemes are known: Gentry's scheme [6] based on ideal lattices and a scheme by van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan (DGHV) over the integers, that appeared at Eurocrypt 2010 [4] .
Gentry's scheme and its implementations. Gentry described in [6] a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that is similar to GGH [8, 15] over ideal lattices. To reduce the degree of the decryption polynomial, Gentry introduced the following transformation [6] : instead of using the original secret key, the decryption procedure uses a very sparse subset of values that adds up to the secret key; the full set of values is made part of the public key. To apply the new decryption procedure the original ciphertext must first be "expanded" using the full set of public values. This expanded ciphertext can then be decrypted with a low-degree polynomial in the bits of the new secret key (which are the characteristic vector of the sparse subset sum); this is called the "squashed decryption" procedure.
At PKC 2010 Smart and Vercauteren [17] made the first attempt to implement Gentry's scheme using a variant based on principal ideal lattices and requiring that the determinant of the lattice be a prime number. However the authors of [17] could not obtain a bootstrappable scheme because that would have required a lattice dimension of at least n = 2 27 , whereas due to the prime determinant requirement they could not generate keys for dimensions n > 2048.
Gentry and Halevi described in [7] the first implementation of Gentry's scheme. The authors follow the same direction as Smart and Vercauteren, but for key generation they eliminate the requirement that the determinant is a prime. Additionally they present many clever optimizations. Four concrete parameter settings are provided, from a "toy" setting in dimension 512, to "small", "medium" and "large" settings of dimensions 2048, 8192 and 32768, respectively. For the "large" setting public key size is 2.3 Gigabytes. The authors of [7] report that for an optimized implementation on a high-end workstation, key generation takes 2.2 hours, encryption takes 3 minutes, and ciphertext refresh takes 30 minutes.
technique to get a bootstrappable scheme and then Gentry's "ciphertext refresh" procedure (see Fig. 1 ) to get a fully homomorphic scheme.
The main appeal of the scheme (compared to the original Gentry's scheme) is its conceptual simplicity; namely all operations are done over the integers instead of ideal lattices. However the public-key was iñ O(λ 10 ) which is too large for any practical system. Our Contributions. In this paper we show how to reduce the public key size of the somewhat homomorphic scheme from O(λ 10 ) down to O(λ 7 ). The idea consists in storing only a smaller subset of the public key and then generating the full public key on the fly by combining the elements in the small subset multiplicatively; we describe the new scheme in Section 3. In Section 4 we show that the new scheme is still semantically secure, but under a stronger variant of the approximate GCD assumption.
Our second contribution is to describe an implementation of the fully homomorphic DGHV scheme under our variant, using some of the optimizations from [7] . We use the refined analysis from [18] of the sparse subset sum problem; however we do not use the probabilistic decryption circuit from [18] because as in [7] the error probability is too high for our set of parameters. The main difficulty is to determine a secure set of concrete parameters; our approach is to implement the known attacks, measure their running time and extrapolate for large parameters; we can then fix the concrete parameters according to the desired level of security.
We obtain similar performances as the Gentry-Halevi implementation of Gentry's scheme [7] . More precisely we use four security levels inspired by the levels from [7] (though they may not be directly comparable due to different notions of "security bits"): "toy", "small", "medium" and "large", corresponding to 42, 52, 62 and 72 bits of security respectively. For "large" parameters, encryption and recryption take 3 minutes and 14 minutes respectively, with a public key size of 800 MBytes. Decryption is always close to instantaneous. This shows that fully homomorphic encryption can be implemented with a simple scheme.
2 The DGHV Scheme over the Integers.
In this section we first recall the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme published by van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan at Eurocrypt 2010 [4] . The scheme is based on a set of public integers:
Notation. We use the same notation as in [4] . For a real number x, we denote by x , x and x the rounding of x up, down, or to the nearest integer. For a real z and an integer p we denote the reduction of z modulo p by [z] 
The scheme parameters. Given the security parameter λ, the following parameters are used:
• γ is the bit-length of the x i 's.
• η is the bit-length of secret key p.
• ρ is the bit-length of the noise r i .
• τ is the number of x i 's in the public key.
• ρ is a secondary noise parameter used for encryption.
For a specific η-bit odd integer p, we use the following distribution over γ-bit integers:
KeyGen(1 λ ). Generate a random odd integer p of size η bits. For 0 ≤ i ≤ τ sample x i ← D γ,ρ (p). Relabel so that x 0 is the largest. Restart unless x 0 is odd and [x 0 ] p is even. Let pk = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . x τ ) and sk = p.
Encrypt(pk, m ∈ {0, 1}). Choose a random subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , τ } and a random integer r in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), and output the ciphertext:
Evaluate(pk, C, c 1 , . . . , c t ): given the circuit C with t input bits, and t ciphertexts c i , apply the addition and multiplication gates of C to the ciphertexts, performing all the additions and multiplications over the integers, and return the resulting integer.
Decrypt(sk, c). Output m ← (c mod p) mod 2. Note that since c mod p = c − p · c/p and p is odd, one can compute instead:
This completes the description of the scheme. It is shown in [4] that the scheme is a somewhat homomorphic scheme and that it is semantically secure under the approximate-GCD assumption.
Definition 2.1 (Approximate GCD). The (ρ, η, γ)-approximate-GCD problem is: For a random η-bit odd integer p, given polynomially many samples from D γ,ρ (p), output p.
Note that after one Mult operation c ← c 1 · c 2 the ciphertext size doubles since there is no modular reduction involved. To reduce the ciphertext size after one Mult two techniques are described in [4] . The second and simpler technique consists in generating x 0 without noise, that is x 0 = q 0 · p, and then reducing the ciphertext modulo x 0 . The scheme is still semantically secure under the (stronger) approximate-GCD assumption with error-free x 0 . While this problem seems easier to solve, as the adversary is given an exact multiple of p, no better attack is known against it than on the unmodified problem.
We recall the constraints on the scheme parameters [4] :
• ρ = ω(log λ) to avoid brute force attack on the noise (see Section 6.1).
• η ≥ ρ·Θ(λ log 2 λ) in order to support homomorphic operations for evaluating the "squashed decryption circuit" (see Section 5).
• γ = ω(η 2 · log λ) in order to thwart lattice-based attacks (see Section 6).
• τ ≥ γ + ω(log λ) for the reduction to approximate GCD [4] .
• ρ = ρ + ω(log λ) for the secondary noise parameter.
To satisfy these constraints the following parameter set is suggested in [4] : ρ = λ, ρ = 2λ, η =Õ(λ 2 ), γ =Õ(λ 5 ) and τ = γ + λ. The public key size is thenÕ(λ 10 ). In practice the size of the x i 's should be at least γ = 2 23 bits to prevent lattice attacks. The public key size is then at least 2 46 bits, which is too large for any practical system.
Our Variant of the DGHV Scheme

Description
Our technique consists in working with integers x ij of the form x i,j = x i,0 · x j,1 mod x 0 for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ β where β is a new parameter. Then only 2β integers x i,b need to be stored in the public key in order to generate the τ = β 2 integers x ij used for encryption. In other words we encrypt using a quadratic form in the public key elements instead of a linear form, which enables to reduce the public key size from τ down to roughly 2 √ τ integers of γ bits. Our technique requires to use an error-free x 0 , that is x 0 = q 0 · p, since otherwise the error would grow too large. Additionally for encryption we consider a linear combination of the x i,j with coefficients in [0, 2 α ) instead of bits; this enables to further reduce the public key size.
KeyGen(1 λ ). Generate a random prime p ∈ [2 η−1 , 2 η ). Let x 0 = q 0 · p where q 0 is a random square free 2 λ -rough 3 integer in [0, 2 γ /p). Generate integers x i,b for 1 ≤ i ≤ β and b ∈ {0, 1}:
where q i,b are random integers in [0, q 0 ) and r i,b are integers in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). Let sk = p and pk = (x 0 , x 1,0 , x 1,1 , . . . x β,0 , x β,1 ).
Encrypt(pk, m ∈ {0, 1}). Generate a random vector b = (b i,j ) of size τ = β 2 and with components in [0, 2 α ). Generate a random integer r in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). Output the ciphertext:
Evaluate and Decrypt: same as in the original scheme, except that ciphertexts are reduced modulo x 0 after addition and multiplication.
Constraints on the Parameters
The first three constraints are the same as in the original DGHV scheme:
• η ≥ (2ρ + α) · Θ(λ log 2 λ) in order to support homomorphic operations for evaluating the "squashed decryption circuit" (see Section 5).
• α · β 2 ≥ γ + ω(log λ) for the reduction to approximate GCD (see Section 4).
• ρ = 2ρ + α + ω(log λ) for the secondary noise parameter (see Section 4).
To satisfy these conditions we can still take ρ = λ, η =Õ(λ 2 ) and γ =Õ(λ 5 ) as in the original scheme, and we can take α = λ, β =Õ(λ 2 ) and ρ = 4λ. The main difference is that instead of having τ =Õ(λ 5 ) integers x i 's, we now have only 2β =Õ(λ 2 ) integers x i . Hence the public key size becomesÕ(λ 7 ) instead ofÕ(λ 10 ). In Section 7.6 we describe concrete parameters in order to resist all known attacks. Remark 3.1. It is possible to generate q 0 as a uniformly random square free 2 λ -rough integer of suitable size in probabilistic polynomial time: it suffices to generate a uniformly random number with known factorization [1] and try again if it has small or repeated factors. However, this makes key generation rather unpractical. Alternatively, one can choose q 0 as the product of (γ − η)/λ 2 random primes, each of size λ 2 bits. 4 This is faster, but the security of the scheme then depends on a slightly more convoluted, though no less plausible, computational assumption, to account for the different key distribution.
Correctness
We refer to Appendix A for the definition of correct homomorphic scheme with respect to a given circuit or circuit set. As in [4, 6] we define a permitted circuit as one where for any i ≥ 1 and any set of integer inputs all less than τ i · 2 i(ρ +2) in absolute value, the generalized circuit's output has absolute value at most 2 i(η−3−n) with n = log 2 (λ + 1) ; we let C E be the set of permitted circuits. As in [4] , we have (see proof in Appendix B):
Lemma 3.1. The scheme from above is correct for C E . 3 An integer is said to be a-rough when it does not contain prime factors smaller than a. Note that for a > 2 such integer must be odd. 4 The reason we choose λ 2 -bit factors rather than λ is because factorization algorithms like ECM have a complexity subexponential in the size of factors, and can thus be used to extract λ-bit prime factors efficiently. In the implementation, to thwart this attack, it is safe to generate q0 as a product of, say, 1000-bit primes.
Remark 3.2. Since "fresh" ciphertexts output by Encrypt have noise at most τ · 2 ρ +2 , the ciphertext output by Evaluate applied to a permitted circuit has noise at most 2 η−3−n < p/(4(λ + 1)). A bound of p/2 would suffice to ensure correct decryption, but this stronger bound will be useful to prove the correctness of the bootstrappable version of this scheme later on.
Remark 3.3. The definition of a permitted circuit doesn't seem to give an easy criterion to determine whether a given computation is permitted. However, it is easy to give a sufficient condition on a multivariate polynomial f for the associated arithmetic circuit C to be permitted. If f is of degree d and if the sum of the absolute values of its coefficients is denoted by f 1 , then C ∈ C E provided that:
Following [4] , we refer to such polynomials f as permitted polynomials, and denote the set of these polynomials by P E .
Security of our Variant
Overview
In this section we show that our variant is still semantically secure, but under the (stronger) error-free approximate GCD assumption. Our security proof follows the same strategy as in [4] : show that an adversary breaking the scheme's semantic security can be converted into a LSB predictor for z mod p, where z is an integer such that z mod p is small; this in turns enables to recover p in the approximate-GCD problem. Similarly to prove the security of our variant we must apply the leftover hash lemma on the hash function family h : [0, 2 α ) β 2 → Z q 0 where:
The main difficulty is to show that h is (almost) pairwise independent; as shown below this requires to study the zeroes of the corresponding quadratic form. We note that our result might be of independent interest since it enables to construct a universal hash function with a small memory footprint.
Leftover Hash Lemma
A family H of hash functions h : X → Y is pairwise independent if for all x = x it holds that Pr h [h(x) = h(x )] = 1/|Y |. Since h is not exactly pairwise independent we introduce a slightly more general definition: 5
Note that this is quite different from "ε-almost universal hash function families" in the sense of Wegman and Carter [20] .
We need the collision probability Pr h←H [h(x) = h(x )] to be at most (1 + ε)/|Y | on average, with negligible ε; 2/|Y | is not good enough.
The following lemma is a straightforward generalization of the usual leftover hash lemma.
Lemma 4.1 (Leftover hash lemma)
. Let H be a family of ε-pairwise independent hash functions. Suppose that h ← H and x ← X are chosen uniformly and independently. Then (h, h(x)) is (
Proof. Let p ∈ R H×Y denote the probability vector corresponding to a random choice of x ∈ X and h ∈ H. We must show that:
|p − 1| 1 ≤ |Y |/|X| + ε where 1 corresponds to the uniform distribution. Observing that p − 1 is orthogonal to 1, we apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the Pythagorean theorem to obtain:
We have 1 2 2 = 1/(|H| · |Y |) and:
Hence, the statistical distance is bounded as:
as desired.
Proof of Pairwise Independence
Let q be an integer. Let H be a hash function family from {0, . . . , 2 α − 1} β×β to Z q . The members h ∈ H are associated to elements
For an odd prime integer q, the hash function family H is ε-pairwise independent, with:
Proof. For each choice of b = b , the probability Pr h←H [h(b) = h(b )] can be expressed in terms of the number of zeros of a certain hyperbolic quadratic form in Z 2β q . More precisely let A = (a ij ) be the β × β matrix in M β (Z q ) given by a ij = b ij − b ij . We have:
Now the quadratic form Q = 1≤i,j≤β a ij u i v j has the matrix
, which is clearly conjugate to
where J is the canonical row echelon form of A. It follows that Q is the orthogonal sum of r hyperbolic planes, with r the rank of A. Hence, its number of zeros is well-known (see e.g. [10, Theorem 6 .32] for the non-degenerate case, from which the general case follows immediately):
In particular, we get:
This estimate is quite sufficient for our purposes, except in the case when r = 1. Therefore, we need to bound the number of pairs (b, b ) such that the corresponding matrix A is of rank 1. Noting that A has all its entries in −2 α + 1, . . . , 2 α − 1, it is enough to bound the cardinality of the set U α of matrices of rank 1 in M β (Z q ) with entries in that interval.
To do so, note that a matrix of rank 1 with a nonzero upper-left entry is entirely determined by its first line and its first column. If the entries are in {−2 α + 1, . . . , 2 α − 1}, this leaves 2 α+1 − 2 choices for the upper-left entries and (2 α+1 − 1) 2β−2 choices for the remainder of the first line and the first column. Hence, there are less than 2 2(α+1)(β−1) matrices in U α with a nonzero upper-left entry (and usually much fewer, since not all first lines and first columns need to give rise to matrices with all their entries in the proper interval). The same argument can be applied to any other nonzero entry (i, j), leading to the coarse bound:
Now, the number of pairs (b, b ) such that the corresponding matrix A is of rank 1 is at most |X| · |U α |, since for any choice of b, there are at most |U α | possible values of b such that A is in U α . We can thus bound the value δ defined by:
which concludes the proof.
Corollary 4.1. When q is a product of distinct primes greater than 2 α , the hash function family H is ε-pairwise independent, with:
where p is the smallest prime factor of q.
Proof. The proof is largely similar to the previous one. See Appendix C for details.
Semantic Security
We are now ready to show that our variant is semantically secure under the (stronger) error-free approximate GCD assumption. The proof follows the same strategy as [4] ; we refer to Appendix D for the details. For two specific integers p and q 0 , we define the modified distribution:
Definition 4.2 (Error-free approximate GCD). The (ρ, η, γ)-error-free-approximate-GCD problem is: For a random η-bit prime integer p, given x 0 = q 0 · p where q 0 is a random square free 2 λ -rough integer in [0, 2 γ /p), and polynomially many samples from D ρ (p, q 0 ), output p.
Theorem 4.1. Let A be an attacker with advantage ε against our variant encryption scheme with parameters (ρ, ρ , η, γ, τ = β 2 ) polynomial in the security parameter λ. There exists an algorithm B for solving the (ρ, η, γ)-error-free-approximate-GCD problem that succeeds with probability at least ε/2. The running time of B is polynomial in the running time of A, λ and 1/ε.
Making the Scheme Fully Homomorphic
The Squashed Scheme
Gentry's transformation to "squash the decryption" consists in adding to the public key some extra information about the secret key and use this extra information to "post process" the ciphertext. Then the post-processed ciphertext can be decrypted by a decryption polynomial of small degree. This requires to introduce an additional complexity assumption, namely the sparse subset-sum assumption.
We follow the description of [4] . Three more parameters κ, θ and Θ are added. Concretely, one uses θ = λ, κ = γ + 2 + log 2 (θ + 1) , and Θ =Õ(λ 3 ). 6 One adds to the public key a set y = {y 1 , . . . , y Θ } of rational numbers in [0, 2) with κ bits of precision, such that there is a sparse subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , Θ} of size θ with i∈S y i 1/p mod 2. The expanded ciphertext is computed using the y i 's. The secret key sk is replaced by the indicator vector of the subset S.
However adding Θ elements y i each of size κ bits would give a public key of size Θ · κ =Õ(λ 8 ), instead ofÕ(λ 7 ) in our variant. Therefore instead of storing the y i 's in the public key as in [4] , we generate the y i 's using a pseudo-random generator 7 f (se). Then only the seed se and y 1 need to be stored in the public key, and the other y i 's can be recovered during ciphertext expansion by applying f (se) again. We obtain the following squashed scheme:
KeyGen. Generate sk * = p and pk * as before. Set x p ← 2 κ /p , choose at random a Θ-bit vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s Θ ) with Hamming weight θ with s 1 = 1, and let S = {i : s i = 1}.
Initialize a system-wide pseudo-random number generator f with a random seed se, and use f (se) to generate integers u i ∈ [0, 2 κ+1 ) for 2 ≤ i ≤ Θ. Then, set u 1 such that i∈S u i = x p mod 2 κ+1 . Set y i = u i /2 κ and y = {y 1 , . . . , y Θ }. Hence each y i is a positive number smaller than two, with κ bits of precision after the binary point. Also,
Output the secret key sk = s and public key pk = (pk * , se, y 1 ).
Encrypt and Evaluate. Generate a ciphertext c * as before. Then for i ∈ {1, . . . , Θ} set z i ← [c * · y i ] 2 , keeping only n = log 2 (θ + 1) bits of precision after the binary point for each z i . Output both c * and z = (z 1 , . . . , z Θ ).
This completes the description of the scheme. Note that as in [7] we use n = log 2 (θ + 1) bits of precision, instead of n = log 2 θ + 3 in the original scheme. This enables to reduce the degree of the decryption polynomial. In practice we will use n = 4. Note that for encryption we don't need to store all the y i 's in memory again; we can generate them one by one from the PRNG to compute z i ← [c * · y i ] 2 with n bits of precision.
The proof of the following lemma is similar to the one in [4] (see Appendix E), but we can handle a smaller precision n, as in [7] , because in our scheme, ciphertext size does not grow in homomorphic operations.
Lemma 5.1. The modified scheme is correct for the set C(P E ) of circuits that compute permitted polynomials.
Bootstrapping
As in [4] , one obtains that the scheme is bootstrappable. From Gentry's theorem we obtain homomorphic encryption schemes for circuits of any depth.
Theorem 5.1. Let E be the scheme above, and let D E be the set of augmented (squashed) decryption circuits. Then, D E ⊂ C(P E ).
Proof. The proof is as in [4] . We provide a slightly different analysis. We consider the decryption equation:
where s i are the secret key bits and z i are rational numbers in [0, 2) with n bits of precision after the binary point (therefore n + 1 bits in total). We must express the decryption equation as a low degree polynomial in the bits s i and the bits in z i , i.e. a permitted polynomial. Fig.  2 the bits of the a i 's are arranged in Θ rows and n + 1 columns (one column before the binary point and n columns after 
which can be done iteratively with at most 2 j · Θ operations. We recall the dynamic programming algorithm from [4] : 1: P0,0 ← 1; P k,0 ← 0 for k = 1, 2, . . . , 2 j . P k, is the k-th symmetric polynomial in b1, . . . , b . 2: for = 1 to θ do 3:
for k = 2 j down to 1 do 4:
end for 6: end for 7: W k ← P 2 k ,θ for k = 0, 1, . . . , j; 8: return W0, . . . , Wj.
Then, the procedure to compute
is as follows. We number the columns containing the a k 's from left to right as 0 (before the binary point), −1, −2, . . . , −n.
As usual, grade-school addition starts from the rightmost column (column −n). Adding all Θ bits from that column produces a bit of result and a certain number of bits of carry. Since we are only interested in the n + 1 least significant bits of the sum, we only need to keep track of the result and the first n carry bits: this amounts to computing the rightmost bits W
of the Hamming weight W (−n) of column −n, which can be done with at most 2 n · Θ multiplications according to the previous lemma. Now, push carry bit W to column −n + 2 and so on. We can then continue the grade-school addition process from column −n + 1, where we only need to compute the result and n − 1 carry bits, namely the bits W to columns −n+2, −n+3, . . . , 0 respectively, move to the next column and continue as before. This is illustrated in Figure 2 for n = 4.
The grade-school addition algorithm requires at most 2 n · Θ + 2 n−1 · (Θ + 1) + 2 n−2 · (Θ + 2) + · · · + 2 · (Θ + n − 1) ≤ 2 n · (Θ + n − 1) ≤ 4θ · Θ multiplications and less than Θ + θ 2 additions between the resulting products.
Furthermore, we can compute the degree of any of the bits involved as a binary polynomial in the bits of the a i 's. Clearly, W (−n) j is of degree 2 j . Then we can see inductively from the shape of the elementary symmetric polynomials that for k ≥ 1, W (−n+k) j is of degree 2 j + 2 k+1 − 3. It follows that the degree of Q as a polynomial in the bits of the a i 's is 2 n (given by the degree of W (−n) n , which is the highest of all). This is illustrated in Figure 2 for n = 4.
Finally, the parity of the integer closest to a i is obtained by xor-ing the Hamming weights of column 0 and −1, and the decryption m is then computed as the xor of the result with the least significant bit of c * . As a result, m is expressed as a polynomial of degree 2 n in the bits of c * and the a i 's, with a coefficient vector of 1-norm less than 2Θ. Since a i is just s i · z i , this means that m is a polynomial f of the ciphertext bits and the secret key satisfying d = deg f = 2 n+1 and f 1 ≤ 2Θ. In view of Remark 3.3, f is a permitted polynomial as long as d ≤ (η − 4 − n − log 2 Θ)/(ρ + 2) which is satisfied by choosing η according to the constraint in Section 3.2.
Attacks
In this section we recall the known attacks. For each attack we provide an asymptotic analysis (as in [4] ) and we also run the attacks in practice in order to derive concrete parameters for our implementation. We use four security levels inspired by the levels from [7] : "toy", "small", "medium" and "large", corresponding to 42, 52, 62 and 72 bits of security respectively. Therefore our "high" level of security corresponds to the "high" level of security in [7] . For security parameter λ we wish to ensure that the best attack requires at least 2 λ clock cycles on a standard PC.
Note that we use the SAGE [14] interface to the fplll lattice reduction package [16] which is to our knowledge the fastest publicly available. However any progress in LLL implementations will require an increase of our security parameters.
Brute Force Attack on the Noise
The easiest attack is the brute force attack on the noise in the public key. Given x 0 = q 0 · p and x 1 = q 1 · p + r 1 with |r 1 | < 2 ρ , one can guess r 1 and compute gcd(x 0 , x 1 − r 1 ) to recover p. The state of the art algorithm for computing GCD's is the Stehlé-Zimmermann algorithm [19] with time complexitỹ O(γ) for integers of γ bits. The attack complexity is then 2 ρ ·Õ(γ). Therefore the attack is thwarted if ρ = ω(log λ).
A better attack [12] consists in computing p = gcd(x 0 ,
Using fast multiplication the asymptotic complexity is also 2 ρ ·Õ(γ).
Concrete parameters. In order to fix ρ we have run some experiments with GCD computations of huge integers. We first describe the results for the basic GCD attack, using the Stehlé-Zimmermann algorithm [19] . The result of practical experiments with the Sage library [14] are summarized in Table 1 ; they are consistent with the running times given in [19] . Table 1 . Running time of a single GCD computation on two random integers of size γ bits, using the Sage library.
The better attack from [12] consists in computing
In this attack the 2 ρ+1 GCD computations are replaced by 2 ρ+1 − 1 modular multiplications of γ-bit integers and one single final GCD computation. The result of practical experiments with the Sage library [14] are summarized in Table 2 . Table 2 . Running time of a single modular multiplication on two random integers of size γ bits, using the Sage library.
The size γ of the x i 's depends on η which depends on ρ, so we cannot determine ρ directly. We refer to Table 4 in Section 7.6 for the concrete parameters. From the log 2 cycles count in Table 2 , one can check that the attack requires at least 2 λ clock cycles for each of the four levels of security.
Approximate-GCD Attack on the Public Key
We do not consider Coppersmith's attack since as shown in [4] it does not apply for the range of parameters. We consider the attack based on Nguyen and Stern's orthogonal lattice [11] (see Section B.1 in [4] ). One considers the set of τ integers x i = p · q i + r i and x 0 = p · q 0 . We consider the first t integers x i and we consider a vector u orthogonal to these first t integers x i modulo x 0 , that is:
Now if the u i 's are sufficiently small, since the r i 's are small this equality will hold over Z. This gives a vector u orthogonal to the r i 's; by collecting sufficiently many such vectors u orthogonal to r = (r i ) one can recover r and eventually the secret key p. In our analysis we consider that the attack succeeds if at least one vector u orthogonal to r in Z has been obtained.
To find u we build the lattice L of row vectors orthogonal to x = (x 1 , . . . , x t ) modulo x 0 . From Minkowski's bound there exists a nonzero lattice vector of norm about √ t · det(L) 1/t 2 γ/t . Since to get u.r = 0 over Z we must have u ∞ ≤ 2 η−ρ < 2 η this gives the condition t > γ/η. However when the lattice dimension t is large, lattice reduction algorithms will not recover such a short vector but only an approximation.
As in [4] we use the following "rule of thumb" conjecture about lattice algorithms performance: there exists a constant µ such that for any k and any dimension t, one cannot find a µ t/k approximation of the shortest vector in time smaller than 2 k . Since we must find a vector u such that u ∞ ≤ 2 η−ρ , we need better than a 2 η−ρ approximation of the shortest vector. To get a 2 η approximation (which is not quite enough to recover u), from t > γ/η the time required is then at least 2 k where k = (log 2 µ)γ/η 2 . We recover the asymptotic condition from [4] :
To derive concrete parameters we have run some experiments with the LLL and BKZ-20 lattice reduction algorithms applied to the following lattice L:
We did not run BKZ with block size ≥ 25 since as observed in [5] the running seems to be exponential in the lattice dimension. Given a "random" lattice L of dimension n without a particularly short vector, one can expect that the shortest vector v has a norm according to Minkowsky bound v √ n · (det L) 1/n . With lattice reduction algorithms, one gets a vector b of norm b c n · (det L) 1/n where c n is called the Hermite factor.
We summarize in Table 3 the result of our practical experiments for estimating the Hermite factor c and the running time. Our values for the Hermite factor are approximately the same as in [5] . Experimentally the running time (expressed in number of clock cycles) can be approximated by:
where the experimental coefficients a, b are given in Table 3 . Table 3 . Hermite factor and running time coefficients for LLL and BKZ-20 lattice reduction algorithms, using the SAGE implementation [14] .
When applying lattice reduction on the lattice L given by (3), we obtain a short vector u of bit-size γ/t + c 2 · t instead of γ/t, where c 2 = log 2 c where the constant c is estimated in Table 3 . Since we must have u ≤ 2 η−ρ < 2 η , this gives the condition γ/t + c 2 · t ≤ η.
We consider the equation η = c 2 · t + γ/t or equivalently:
Let ∆ = η 2 − 4γc 2 be the discriminant of this equation. If ∆ < 0, then the previous equation has no solution. Therefore given η one could fix γ such that ∆ < 0; this would give the condition γ ≥ η 2 /(4c 2 ). However we wish to use a smaller value for γ. For ∆ > 0 the smallest solution of equation (5) is:
This is the minimum lattice dimension for which a lattice reduction algorithm with Hermite constant c 2 = log 2 c can output a vector u sufficiently short to be orthogonal to r. From the dimension t min and γ one can then extrapolate the running time of the lattice reduction algorithm using the estimate in (4). We require that for security parameter λ we have:
for both lattice reduction algorithms LLL and BKZ-20. Therefore given η we must fix a large enough γ such that:
for both LLL and BKZ-20, with values (a, b, c 2 = log 2 c) from Table 3 . Since BKZ-20 outputs shorter vectors the value of t min is smaller for BKZ-20 than for LLL; however BKZ-20 takes more time than LLL. In our experiments we found that it was more advantageous to run LLL on larger dimensions. We refer to Table 4 in Section 7.6 for the concrete parameters
Lattice Attack on the Sparse Subset-sum Problem
We use the refined analysis from [18] of the sparse subset sum problem. The attacker must solve the equation:
where the u i 's are known and the secret-key s = (s 1 , . . . , s Θ ) is of small Hamming weight θ. We assume that the attack knows p and therefore x p .
We consider the knapsack lattice of row vectors from [3] :
We have that (±1, . . . , ±1, 0) is a short vector of the lattice of norm √ Θ. The determinant of the lattice is det L 2 Θ+κ = 2 Θ+γ+2 . From Minkowsky's bound we can expect that the norm of the second shortest vector is (det L) 1/Θ 2 γ/Θ . Asymptotic analysis. To find the shortest vector we need better than a 2 γ/Θ approximation. From the lattice "Rule of Thumb" conjecture with the previous notations the time required is then at least 2 k with k = (log 2 µ)Θ 2 /γ. Asymptotically the condition is therefore:
Therefore with γ =Õ(λ 5 ) we can take Θ =Õ(λ 3 ).
Concrete parameters. As observed in [5] the minimum gaps for which LLL or BKZ can retrieve the shortest vector is proportional (up to a small constant) to the corresponding Hermite factor. Since the shortest vector has norm √ Θ and the second shortest vector has norm 2 γ/Θ , we obtain the following condition for finding the shortest vector: log 2 √ Θ + c 2 · Θ ≤ γ/Θ, where c 2 = log 2 c where the constant c is estimated in Table 3 . Therefore to avoid the previous attack one could take the constraint Θ 2 ≥ γ/c 2 .
However we observed experimentally that running LLL and BKZ-20 against the knapsack lattice L takes approximately the same amount of time as running LLL and BKZ-20 against the lattice L in section 6.2, for the same lattice dimension t = Θ and the same value of γ. In Section 6.2 the value γ has been determined such that the LLL and BKZ-20 running times both satisfy T (t min , γ) ≥ 2 λ . Note that the value of t min for LLL is larger than for BKZ-20. Therefore we can take the value of t min from equation (6) that corresponds to LLL and use the weaker constraint Θ = t min . Then LLL (and therefore BKZ-20) will take at least 2 λ clock cycles on the lattice L of this section.
Birthday-like Attack on the Sparse Subset-sum Problem
There is a birthday-like exhaustive search attack against the sparse subset sum in the squashed scheme [7] . When using the optimization from [7] which consists in representing the secret key s in θ boxes of B = Θ/θ bits each, such that each box has a single 1-bit in it (see Section 7.2), the attack has complexity (Θ/θ) (θ−1)/2 . Therefore asymptotically we must have θ log Θ = ω(log λ) and for concrete parameters the attack complexity must be ≥ 2 λ .
7 Implementation of the Fully Homomorphic Scheme
Recryption
Now that decryption can be expressed as an arithmetic circuit of low depth, it is possible to achieve bootstrapping, i.e. to publicly evaluate the decryption circuit homomorphically on a ciphertext, which produces another ciphertext for the same message, but with possibly less noise (a "recryption"). This process, which is Gentry's key idea [6] for achieving fully homomorphic encryption, is illustrated in Figure 1 . The procedure that evaluates the decryption circuit homomorphically, called Recrypt, takes as input encryptions of the ciphertext bits, and encryptions of the secret key bits.
In the case of the DGHV scheme or of our variant, 0 and 1 are valid encryptions of themselves, so the ciphertext bits can be passed as is to the decryption circuit. However, encryptions of the secret key bits should also be made available publicly, so the key generation from §5.1 should be modified to include encryptions σ i of the s i 's into the public key pk = (pk * , y, σ). Then the Recrypt procedure is simply obtained by applying the decryption circuit to the ciphertext bits and the encrypted secret key bits.
Note that such ciphertexts σ i are normally generated using the x i,b 's from the public key, leading to σ i 's with noise of size ρ . However since we are at key generation phase we can do better and let σ i = s i + 2r i + p · q i mod x 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ Θ, for random integers q i modulo q 0 and random integers r i in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). The resulting ciphertexts σ i have the same distribution as regular ciphertexts but with noise ρ instead of ρ . Since ρ < ρ this enables to reduce the size η of p required to achieve bootstrappability.
For the refreshed ciphertext to decrypt correctly, its noise must be small enough, and in fact small enough that a multiplication operation between refreshed ciphertexts still decrypts correctly. The ciphertext bits are noise-free encryptions of themselves and the encrypted secret key bits contain ρ bits of noise, so one must have d · ρ < η/2, where d is the degree of the decryption circuit discussed in the previous section (or in fact, only half that degree, because only the degree with respect to the secret key bits matters; the contribution in the ciphertext bits z i can be ignored as they are used directly and without noise).
Optimization of the Decryption Circuit
We use the optimization from [4] which consists in representing the secret key s in θ boxes of B = Θ/θ bits each, such that each box has a single 1-bit in it. This enables to obtain a grade-school addition algorithm that requires O(θ 2 ) multiplications of bits instead of O(Θ · θ).
More precisely we denote by s k,i the i-th secret key bit in box k, where 1 ≤ k ≤ θ and 1 ≤ i ≤ B. We use the same subscript notation for the expanded ciphertext with z k,i . The decryption equation becomes:
The observation from [7] is that the sum q k
is obtained by adding B numbers, only one being non-zero. Therefore to compute the j-th bit of q k it suffices to xor all the j-th bits of the numbers s k,i · z k,i . When applying homomorphic decryption, this corresponds to simply adding modulo x 0 all the ciphertexts corresponding to these bits. See Figure 3 for an illustration of the decryption circuit.
The decryption equation is now m ← c * − θ k=1 q k mod 2 where the q k 's are rational in [0, 2) with n bits of precision after the binary point. As in [7] it suffices to perform a grade-school addition of the q k 's. The bits of the q k 's are arranged in θ rows and n + 1 columns (one column before the binary point and n columns after); see Figure 2 for an illustration with n = 4. In this case, note that the decryption polynomial is of degree 2 n − 1 in the q k 's (the degree of W (−1) 1 , in the notations of Section 5.2) instead of 2 n as before, because the n-th carry bit of the leftmost column W (−n) n vanishes. Since we choose θ as a power of 2 minus 1, this means that the decryption polynomial is of degree θ in the secret key bits overall.
Compression of Encrypted Secret Key Bits
The modification of the public key described previously, to accommodate for the Recrypt procedure, has the problem of increasing public key size significantly. Namely the vector σ in the enlarged public key consists of Θ =Õ(λ 3 ) ciphertexts, each of size γ =Õ(λ 5 ), so we obtain a public key size ofÕ(λ 8 ), instead ofÕ(λ 7 ) in the basic scheme.
To alleviate this problem, an additional compression trick is described in [7] . Instead of generating the secret key as a single bit vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s Θ ), one uses two bit vectors s (0) and s (1) of length √ Θ, and s is then recovered on the fly during decryption as the following matrix with Θ entries:
The bit vectors s (0) and s (1) are chosen such that s is of Hamming weight θ. This can be combined with the division in "boxes" described in §7.2: s (0) and s (1) can be divided in √ θ boxes of length √ B = Θ/θ, each of Hamming weight 1, yielding a natural division of s in θ boxes of length B.
Then, the public key only needs to contain encryptions of the bits of s (0) and s (1) , namely vectors σ (0) and σ (1) given by
with r i,b and q i,b chosen at random in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ) and [0, q 0 ) respectively. This makes it possible to recover encryptions σ of the bits of s on the fly at the time of recryption. This brings down public key size to about √ Θ · γ =Õ(λ 6.5 ). Note on the other hand that this increases the noise in σ by a factor of 2 since the σ i,j are obtained as products of two ciphertexts; this implies that to keep bootstrappability the size η of p must be doubled.
Clearly, it is possible to compress the encrypted secret key bits further by using products of three σ i 's or more, but this increases the noise even further. For our purposes, we have found the choice of two vectors σ (b) of encrypted secret key bits to be optimal.
Smaller Dimension for Knapsack Encryption
From the previous section the size of the public key in the full scheme is now about (β + √ Θ) · γ bits. The conditions from Section 3.2 imply that we must have β =Õ(λ 2 ) to apply the leftover hash lemma. Since √ Θ =Õ(λ 1.5 ) we have that β is the bottleneck. Therefore in practice we would like to use a smaller β, for which the leftover hash lemma would not apply but no attack would work.
This implies that we must consider a lattice attack against the knapsack sum in the encryption algorithm. The analysis is the same as in Section 6.3, with τ = β 2 instead of Θ. This gives the asymptotic condition τ 2 = γ · ω(log λ) which for α < τ is weaker than the condition α · τ ≥ γ + ω(log λ) necessary for the reduction to the approximate GCD problem. Under this condition we can take τ =Õ(λ 3 ) instead of τ =Õ(λ 4 ) and therefore β =Õ(λ 1.5 ) instead of β =Õ(λ 2 ). The public key size is then (β + √ Θ) · γ =Õ(λ 6.5 ) instead ofÕ(λ 7 ).
Fully Homomorphic Scheme complete Description
For completeness we provide a complete description of the fully homomorphic scheme.
KeyGen(1 λ ). Generate a random odd integer p of size η bits. Pick a number q 0 ∈ [0, 2 γ /p) chosen as a product of random λ 2 -bit primes, and let x 0 = q 0 · p. Generate β pairs x i,0 , x i,1 of integers with for 1 ≤ i ≤ β:
where q i,b are random integers in [0, q 0 ) and r i,b are integers in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). Let pk * = (x 0 , x 1,0 , x 1,1 , . . . , x β,0 , x β,1 ). Additionally generate random bit vectors s (0) and s (1) of length √ Θ , subject to the conditions that s Initialize a system-wide pseudo-random number generator f with a random seed se, and use f (se) to generate integers 
Finally, output the secret key as sk = (s (0) , s (1) ), and the public key as pk = (pk * , se, u 1,1 , σ (0) , σ (1) ).
Encrypt(pk, m ∈ {0, 1}). Choose a random integer matrix b = (b ij ) 1≤i,j≤β ∈ [0, 2 α ) β×β and a random integer r in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ). Output the ciphertext:
. This procedure, ciphertext expansion, takes a ciphertext c * and computes the associated z-matrix. We can think of it as separate from either encryption or decryption, as it can be executed publicly given the ciphertext and public data. To do so, for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ √ Θ first compute the random integer u i,j using the seeded pseudo-random number generator f (se), then let y i,j = u i,j /2 κ and compute z i,j given by:
keeping only n = log 2 (θ + 1) bits of precision after the binary point. Define the matrix z = (z i,j ). Output the expanded ciphertext c = (c * , z).
j · z i,j 2 . Recrypt(pk, c * , z). Apply the decryption circuit to the expanded ciphertext z and the encrypted secret key bits σ (b)
i . Output the result as a refreshed ciphertext c * new .
Concrete Parameters
From the analysis of the known attacks in the previous section we are now ready to derive the concrete parameters for the four levels of security. For all four levels we take θ = 15. In this case the degree of the decryption polynomial is 2θ = 30 when using the degree-2 compression of the encryption of the secret key bits. Since we must allow for an additional multiplication after Recrypt, the total degree is d = 4 · θ = 60.
To allow for some margin we take η = (d + 8)ρ = 68 · ρ. We obtain the parameters given in Table 4 . Table 4 . Concrete parameters and corresponding timings, as measured using our implementation in Sage 4.5.3 [14] and GMP 4.3.2 [9] , on a single core of a desktop computer with an Intel Core2 Duo E8500 CPU at 3.12 GHz. The public key is roughly 2(β + √ Θ + 1)γ bit long. Note that almost all the CPU time of key generation is spent in primality tests, to generate a rough q0.
C Proof of Corollary 4.1
Again, given b = b , we have to estimate the number of zeros N of the quadratic form 1≤i,j≤β a ij u i v j mod q where a ij = b i − b i . Now, write q as the product of primes p 1 · · · p k with p 1 < · · · < p k . Then the Chinese remainder theorem ensures than N = N 1 · · · N k where N is the number of zeros of the quadratic form mod p . As we have previously seen, this satisfies:
where r is the rank of the matrix A = (a ij ) mod p . In particular, if the reduction of A mod p is of rank ≥ 2 for all , we obtain:
where p = p 1 is the smallest prime factor of q (and e = exp (1)).
On the other hand, the bound is less convenient if r ≤ 1 for some . Note that r = 0 cannot happen, since in view of the condition p > 2 α , a ij = 0 mod p implies b ij = b ij . So we only have to consider the case of rank 1. If r = 1 for some , we have:
α of matrices of rank 1 in M β (Z p ) with entries in {−2 α + 1, . . . , 2 α − 1} is bounded as before: |U ( ) α | < β 2 · 2 2(α+1)β for all . Therefore, the set U α matrices in M β (Z q ) with entries in the proper interval and a rank 1 reduction mod p for some contains at most k times that many matrices:
Again, we can then bound the value δ given by:
It remains to observe that k ≤ (log q)/(log p) to conclude.
D Proof of Theorem 4.1
We follow the same proof strategy as in [4] . Consider an attacker A against our encryption scheme with non-negligible advantage ε for parameters (ρ, ρ , η, γ, τ ). In other words, A takes as input a public key and a ciphertext (produced by KeyGen and Encrypt of our variant), and outputs the correct plaintext bit with probability at least 1/2 + ε. Using A we mimick the method from [4] to construct an algorithm B to solve the (ρ, η, γ)-error-free-approximate-GCD problem.
B is given a γ-bit number of the form p · q 0 , where p is a random η-bit odd integer and q 0 is a random integer from the interval [0, 2 γ /p). In addition, B is allowed to sample D ρ (p, q 0 ) polynomially many times. Its goal is to recover p with non-negligible probability.
At the cost of a loss in success probability at most polynomial in λ, we will assume that q 0 is a 2 λ -rough square free integer, as this property is satisfied by a polynomial fraction of integers in [0, 2 γ /p).
The algorithm B is then as follows.
Step 1: Creating a public Key Let x 0 = p · q 0 as given to B. We assume that q 0 is a randomly chosen integer in the interval [0, 2 γ/p ), as well as square-free and 2 λ -rough. We also sample x i,0 , x i,1 ← D ρ (p, q 0 ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ β. Clearly, pk = (x 0 , x 1,0 , x 1,1 · · · , x β,0 , x β,1 ) follows the same distribution as the public key generated by KeyGen.
Step 2: High Accuracy LSB predictor For any integer z, let q p (z) and r p (z) denote the quotient and remainder of z with respect to p. Given any z ∈ [0, 2 γ ) that is at most 2 ρ away from a multiple of p, the following subroutine tells us the least significant bit of q p (z) with high probability.
Learn-LSB(z, pk): Input: z ∈ [0, 2 γ ) with r p (z) < 2 ρ , a public key pk = (x 0 , x 1,0 , x 1,1 · · · , x β,0 , x β,1 ) Output: The least significant bit of q p (z)
Lemma D.1. Fix the parameters (ρ, ρ , η, γ, τ ) and the secret key sk = p. Let pk = (x 0 , x 1,0 , x 1,1 , . . . . . . , x β,0 , x β,1 ) be generated at random as in the KeyGen. For every integer x * ∈ [0, 2 γ ) that is at most 2 ρ away from a multiple of p, consider the following distribution Then with overwhelming probability (over the choice of sk, pk), every distribution C pk (x * ) is statistically close to the distribution Encrypt(pk, m = [x * ] 2 ).
Proof. The proof is the same as in Lemma 4.3 of [4] , except that we use our generalized version of Leftover hash lemma (Lemma 4.1) and Corollary 4.1. Writing c = q p + 2r + m, the idea is to show separately that q and r are distributed as in the scheme. Regarding the noise r , since ρ = 2ρ + α + ω(log λ), the additional noise r added in the distribution is drawn from a set of cardinality superpolynomially larger than the noise in the public key elements and in the integer x * . This ensures that the distribution of r is statistically close to the uniform distribution in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), as in regular encryption.
On the other hand, with our choice of parameters (in particular αβ 2 = γ + ω(log λ)) and with q 0 being a 2 λ -rough integer, Corollary 4.1, together with our generalization of the leftover hash lemma (Lemma 4.1), implies that the statistical distance between the distribution of q p (c) = i,j b i,j · q i,0 · q j,1 mod q 0 for a regular ciphertext c and the uniform distribution in Z q 0 is negligible. But q is the sum mod q 0 of such a value q p (c) with a random number, so its distribution is also statistically close to uniform.
Thus, the distributions of both q and r are statistically close to the distributions of q p (c) and r p (c) for c = Encrypt(pk, m), which concludes the proof.
E Proof of Lemma 5.1
Fix a permitted polynomial P (x 1 , . . . , x t ) ∈ P E , an arithmetic circuit C that computes P , and t fresh ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c t that encrypt the input to C. Then, let c * = Evaluate(pk, C, c 1 , . . . , c t ).
As recalled in §3, the correct decrypted message m is given by [c * − c * /p ] 2 , so what we need to show is that c * /p = i s i z i mod 2. To see this, recall first from Remark 3.2 that c * /p is at most 1/(4(θ + 1)) away from the nearest integer c * /p . On the other hand, recall that each z i is computed as [c * · y i ] 2 keeping only n bits of precision after the binary point, so that we can write z i = [c * · y i ] 2 + δ i with |δ i | < 2 −(n+1) ≤ 1/(2(θ + 1)). Thus, we get, as in [4] :
This allows us to bound the difference mod 2:
(c
Therefore, the distance mod 2 of s i z i to c * /p is strictly less than 1/(4(θ + 1)) + 2 γ−κ + θ/(2(θ + 1)). Now 2 γ−κ = 2 −n−2 ≤ 1/(4(θ + 1)), so the total distance is strictly less than 1/2. This concludes the proof.
